
Functionalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Aug 24, 2004 · Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on …
Functionalism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Aug 24, 2004 · Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on …
The Computational Theory of Mind - Stanford Encyclopedia of …
Oct 16, 2015 · According to functionalism, a system has a mind when the system has a suitable functional organization. Mental states are states that play appropriate roles in the system’s …
Multiple Realizability - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Nov 23, 1998 · Functionalism, on the other hand, seems to be at the correct level of abstraction up from explanations of behavior based on physical mechanisms. In particular, it seems …
Representational Theories of Consciousness - Stanford …
May 22, 2000 · What are distinctive about that mode of representation are (a) the functional considerations needed to specify the relevant sense modality, and (b) assuming “experience” …
Mental Causation (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Dec 18, 2003 · Think of functional states as nodes in a network of states, the identity of which depends on the relations they bear to other nodes, and think of the realizers as occupants of …
The Mind/Brain Identity Theory - Stanford Encyclopedia of …
Jan 12, 2000 · Functionalism identifies mental states and processes by means of their causal roles, and as noted above in connection with Lewis, we know that the functional roles are …
Qualia (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Aug 20, 1997 · One standard functionalist reply to cases like the China-body system is to bite the bullet and to argue that however strange it seems, the China-body system could not fail to …
Operationalism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Jul 16, 2009 · Operationalism is based on the intuition that we do not know the meaning of a concept unless we have a method of measurement for it. It is commonly considered a theory …
Teleological Theories of Mental Content - Stanford Encyclopedia …
Jun 18, 2004 · That said, the distinction between functionalism and what might be termed “teleo-functionalism” is less stark than might be thought (cf. Neander 2017, 90). One reason is that …